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Organized Economic Crime in Illegal Import Supply Chains in Indonesia: An Economic Criminology Analysis of the Role of the Indonesian National Police

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ABSTRACT: This article reframes illegal importation in Indonesia as organized economic crime and asks how the Indonesian National Police can position itself strategically along the illegal-import supply chain to disrupt it. Drawing on economic criminology, the Business Enterprise paradigm, and the analysis of illicit supply chains, it argues that the activity is an enterprise operating across distinct stages and not a customs offense committed at the point of entry. A conceptual and integrative literature review maps the chain from foreign origin to online distribution, locates the economic incentives at the customs node, and overlays the jurisdictional boundary that separates the Directorate General of Customs and Excise from the police. The police operate downstream of where incentives form, so seizure-led enforcement displaces the modus operandi without reducing volume. The article synthesizes these propositions into a framework that positions police intervention points along the chain and finds the highest leverage in the revenue and asset-recovery tiers and in shared intelligence, not in downstream prosecution. The claims stand as analytical propositions for empirical testing in subsequent research.

INTRODUCTION

Trade liberalization and Indonesia's maritime geography together make illegal importation a structural feature of the national economy. With one of the longest coastlines in the world, thousands of unofficial landing points, and direct land and sea borders with neighboring states, the archipelago offers abundant entry routes that formal customs control cannot cover. Recent reporting indicates that between thirty and forty warehouses of illegally imported goods operate in each province and that much of this stock is resold through online platforms, while non-declaration along the Strait of Malacca and the eastern coast of Sumatra, together with the seizure of thousands of bales of used clothing by the National Police Criminal Investigation Agency, shows how routine the phenomenon has become (Ramdania et al., 2025; Sinamo et al., 2022; Rahmawati, 2022; Akili & Achmad, 2023). Illegal importation can no longer be described as an ordinary administrative or economic offense, because it erodes state revenue and distorts legitimate markets over time. Indonesian positive law already treats it as serious: Article 102B of the Customs Law punishes smuggling that disrupts the national economy with five to twenty years of imprisonment, a penalty that exceeds the four-year threshold by which the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime defines a serious crime (Zabyelina, 2023).

The stakes are not confined to a single product. The prohibited-import regime now consolidated in Minister of Trade Regulation No. 47 of 2025 covers a range of goods, and used clothing, although the most visible case, stands in for a wider pattern in which restricted or banned items enter the country outside the formal channel (Ministry of Trade, 2026). The harm runs in two directions at once. The state forgoes the duties and taxes that lawful importation would yield, and domestic producers, many of them small and medium enterprises that cannot match the prices of goods which have escaped duty, mandatory standards, and the ordinary cost of lawful entry, lose market share to a competitor whose advantage is built on evasion. Understood in these terms, illegal importation is not a victimless lapse of paperwork but a transfer of value from the public treasury and from compliant firms to an enterprise organized around the border, which is the reason the activity merits the analytical attention this article gives it rather than routine administrative treatment.

Despite the gravity of the phenomenon, Indonesian scholarship has approached it mainly through a juridical and normative lens and has examined the role of the Indonesian National Police (INP) in legal and formal terms, namely its investigative authority and its coordination with the civil-servant investigators of the Directorate General of Customs and Excise (DJBC) (Tondy, 2019; Ramdania et al., 2025; Sinamo et al., 2022; Rahmawati, 2022). Three gaps follow. Economic criminology has not been brought to bear, so the profit logic that organizes the activity remains undertheorized. Illegal importation has not been read as a supply chain, so few studies ask where along its course value is generated. Most consequentially, scholars have not positioned the police analytically within the architecture of the crime, particularly in relation to the customs authority. This article argues that illegal importation in Indonesia is better understood as an organized economic enterprise operating along a supply chain, and that the effectiveness of the INP depends on where along that chain it can intervene relative to the customs jurisdiction. A single question guides the study: how can the Indonesian National Police position itself strategically along the illegal-import supply chain to disrupt organized economic crime?

Three conceptual anchors inform the analysis, and a brief account of each clarifies what the article borrows. The first is economic criminology, which studies crime as economic conduct and treats offenders as actors who respond to prices, costs, and opportunities in markets. Within this tradition, Zabyelina (2023) defines organized economic crime through three markers. A profit motive supplies the organizing purpose, an organized or collective structure carries out the activity, and the conduct reaches a level of seriousness that, under the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, attaches to offenses punishable by at least four years of imprisonment. The lens matters here because illegal importation is, before anything else, a way of making money by moving goods across a border at lower cost than the law allows.

The second anchor is the Business Enterprise paradigm developed by Dean et al. (2010). It departs from accounts that define organized crime by ethnicity or conspiracy and treats it instead as illegal entrepreneurialism, a business that answers to supply, demand, and market share and that passes through phases of establishing, expanding, consolidating, and positioning itself. From this premise the paradigm derives a hierarchy of intervention strategies arranged from civil to criminal, namely administrative, regulatory, revenue, asset-recovery, and prosecutorial remedies, and it argues that an agency with limited resources must position itself where intervention does most to disrupt the business instead of spreading effort evenly. The market view of the offender and the graded menu of responses together give the article its analytical backbone.

The third anchor reads illicit trade as a supply chain. Kupatadze (2025) analyzes it across macro, meso, and micro levels and follows the goods, the money, and the documents, and comparative studies show that illicit supply networks repeat certain structural features across commodities as different as drugs, wildlife, and sand (Anzoom et al., 2021; Magliocca et al., 2021). The chain has a weak point at the border, which a model of collusion and sorting explains, because officials who expect light penalties can let some consignments pass for a payment, so the entry node becomes the place where bargains are struck and value is set (Kim & Tajima, 2022). Reading illegal importation as a chain instead of an event is what makes the question of where to intervene meaningful.

Two further strands support the framing. Work that measures the economic damage of organized crime across national settings warrants treating illegal importation as a serious economic crime instead of a regulatory nuisance (Edelbacher et al., 2016; Fioroni et al., 2025; Wu et al., 2025), and scholarship that treats organized and financial crime as intertwined points toward the financial countermeasures that the analysis later recommends (Jasinski et al., 2023).

METHOD

This article is a conceptual and integrative literature review and does not draw on primary data. The method fits the problem, which is theoretical rather than empirical: it asks how several established but largely separate bodies of knowledge, namely economic criminology, the Business Enterprise paradigm, the analysis of illicit supply chains, and the Indonesian scholarship on customs enforcement, can be recombined into a single account of where the Indonesian National Police can intervene along the illegal-import chain. An integrative review suits this purpose because, unlike a systematic review or a meta-analysis, it adopts a broad scope and synthesizes conceptual and empirical work from different disciplines into a new framework rather than summarizing prior findings or pooling them statistically (Torraco, 2005; Snyder, 2019). The review draws on four kinds of source: peer-reviewed articles in criminology, economics, and trade studies; scholarly books and institutional reports that develop the relevant theory; Indonesian legal instruments, namely the Customs Law, the Trade Law, the Money-Laundering Law, the Police Law, and the implementing trade regulations; and official enforcement reporting from the Directorate General of Customs and Excise and the Ministry of Trade. Because the account is built from secondary materials, it advances an analytical argument rather than a test of hypotheses.

Analysis proceeded in three steps. The sources were first organized into four thematic clusters: the theory of economic and organized crime, the mechanics of illicit supply chains, the literature on corruption and customs evasion, and the Indonesian studies on smuggling and policing. These clusters were read against one another to surface agreements, tensions, and gaps. The macro-meso-micro reading of illicit trade then served as the analytical lens that aligned these clusters along the stages of the supply chain, onto which the jurisdictional division between the customs authority and the police was overlaid in order to locate the points where intervention is possible and those where it is structurally constrained. The single output of this procedure is a framework, presented as a figure, that positions the intervention points of the Indonesian National Police along the chain. The credibility of the argument rests on the convergence of independent sources rather than on statistical inference, and its principal limitation is the absence of primary data; for this reason the central claims are stated as analytical propositions, and their empirical examination, including confirmatory input from customs, police, and trade authorities, is reserved for the subsequent thesis research that this study introduces.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Indonesian enforcement practice and the scholarship that describes it treat illegal importation as a customs offense committed at the point of entry, a discrete event to be detected, seized, and prosecuted (Tondy, 2019; Sinamo et al., 2022; Rahmawati, 2022). Economic criminology reframes the same activity as organized economic crime, and that reframing carries the novelty of this article. Zabyelina (2023) identifies three markers, and the Indonesian evidence meets each. A profit motive organizes the activity, because importers evade duties and the Indonesian National Standard and then capture resale margins in online markets, so profit governs every stage instead of a single transaction. An organized structure appears in the dozens of warehouses reported in each province, which presuppose a division of labor across entry, storage, and marketing (Ramdania et al., 2025). The trade in used clothing illustrates the pattern, since baled garments enter through minor ports despite a standing import ban, accumulate in inland warehouses, and reach buyers through online and physical markets, with enforcement reaching thousands of bales seized in single operations (Sinamo et al., 2022; Ramdania et al., 2025). The warehouse count is indicative, not proof of a single integrated network, and the article treats it as a signal to be tested rather than a conclusion. Seriousness is settled by positive law, since Article 102B of the Customs Law carries five to twenty years of imprisonment for smuggling that disturbs the national economy and so exceeds the four-year threshold that the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime sets for a serious crime.

The profit motive can be specified more precisely. Economic-criminology scholarship locates the drivers of acquisitive crime in a combination of opportunity, pressure, and rationalization rather than in economic hardship alone, since much profit-driven crime is committed by actors who are already advantaged (Parameswaran & Shafi, 2025). Each of these elements is present in illegal importation. The discretion of border officials and the porousness of minor ports supply the opportunity; the margins available from evading a prohibited-goods regime supply the pressure and the reward; and the routine, normalized character of the trade supplies the rationalization that lets participants treat the offense as ordinary commerce. The three markers are therefore not only present but mutually reinforcing, because the conditions that open the opportunity also enlarge the reward.

The organized-structure marker, in turn, extends beyond any single commodity. Comparative research on illicit trade finds that criminal networks treat an established route, together with the border relationships that protect it, as reusable infrastructure for moving whatever commodity is most profitable at a given moment, so that distinct illicit flows converge on the same corridors and the same corrupted points of passage (Anagnostou et al., 2025). Whether or not Indonesia's used-clothing networks in fact diversify, the analytical point stands: the value of a protected entry route lies in its generality, so the structure that moves baled garments is the kind of structure capable of moving other goods, and the seriousness of the activity is understated when it is read as a discrete clothing offense. This observation carries a corollary that the article develops later, since convergence is obscured by siloed enforcement and becomes visible only when customs and police share what each observes separately.

The Business Enterprise paradigm gives these static markers movement. Dean et al. (2010) describe organized crime as illegal entrepreneurialism, a business that establishes, expands, consolidates, and positions itself while answering to demand, supply, and market share. On this reading, illegal importation is an enterprise that operates across stages, not a point at which a rule is broken, and the shift from a static test to a moving enterprise is what opens the supply-chain analysis that follows. No Indonesian study has yet read the activity in these terms. The harm that justifies the label of serious economic crime appears across several national settings, where organized crime suppresses corporate innovation, induces public-sector corruption, and drains public resources (Edelbacher et al., 2016; Fioroni et al., 2025; Wu et al., 2025). In Indonesia the scale is not abstract: single enforcement operations have seized volumes in the tens of thousands of bales. One August 2025 action in West Java reached 19,391 bales valued at roughly IDR 112 billion, underscoring a magnitude of foregone revenue and market distortion that fits the category of serious economic crime rather than a regulatory nuisance (Ministry of Trade, 2026). Once illegal importation is seen as an enterprise rather than an event, two questions become unavoidable, namely where along its operation value is produced and where the state can intervene.

The enterprise reading invites a supply-chain analysis. Kupatadze (2025) reads illicit trade across three levels and follows the goods, the money, and the documents. The macro level concerns the trade flows and price gaps that make a route profitable, the meso level concerns the firms, brokers, and officials who organize movement, and the micro level concerns the individual consignment and its paperwork. Research on illicit supply networks shows that such structures share recurring features across very different commodities and reward attention to their nodes instead of their endpoints (Anzoom et al., 2021; Magliocca et al., 2021). Mapped onto Indonesia, the chain runs through five stages: a foreign origin, maritime transit, the customs entry point, warehousing, and online distribution. Origin and transit lie largely beyond domestic reach. The customs entry point is the gate at which value and documents are tested. Warehousing aggregates and conceals the goods inland, and online distribution disperses them to buyers. Each stage poses a distinct enforcement problem, and the stages do not weigh equally, because the economics of the crime concentrate at one of them.

That stage is entry. Importers misdeclare value, quantity, and tariff classification, and they route undeclared cargo through minor ports along the Strait of Malacca and the eastern coast of Sumatra. Mis-invoicing serves several motives at once, from duty evasion to capital flight, and it resists precise measurement, which complicates any attempt to size the problem (Nitsch, 2017). The entry node is also where officials and importers reach accommodations. Kim and Tajima (2022) model how border agents who expect light penalties sort shipments and allow some to pass for a payment, and Sequeira (2016) demonstrates with firm-level evidence that border bribery can substitute for tariffs and bend trade flows. Value is set at the customs node, upstream of the point where most police attention falls. Enforcement reporting in 2026 is consistent with this enterprise reading: in June 2026 the customs authority intercepted forty-three containers of baled used clothing, an estimated 4,687 bales worth about IDR 37.5 billion, moving inter-island from Pontianak to Tanjung Priok and detected through intelligence rather than at the customs line (Directorate General of Customs and Excise, 2026).

The incentive to manipulate declarations rises with the strength of the barrier at the border. Evidence from countries acceding to the World Trade Organization shows that the underreporting of import prices increases with the tariff rate, and that when one channel of evasion is closed, namely the discretion of officials to assess prices, importers do not abandon evasion but switch to underreporting quantities and misclassifying products, so that the overall level of evasion is left unchanged (Javorcik & Narciso, 2017). The same logic extends beyond tariffs to non-tariff measures: where a measure is restrictive, traders mis-declare the country of origin or misclassify the product to escape it, and the gap between partner records widens as the measure becomes more restrictive (Kee & Nicita, 2022). This bears directly on Indonesia, because a prohibition is the most restrictive measure of all. The ban on used-clothing imports does not remove the incentive to bring the goods in; it raises the premium on disguising them, which is why the cargo enters mislabeled, undervalued, or simply undeclared rather than not at all. The economics thus concentrate on the customs node and predict substitution across techniques rather than deterrence, which is the very pattern that downstream seizure cannot reach.

These manipulations are rarely the work of isolated importers. Where customs discretion meets private interest, evasion tends to be organized and protected: in Tunisia, firms connected to the ruling family evaded import tariffs more than other firms, especially on high-tariff goods and chiefly through underpricing, gaining a cost advantage that rested on connection rather than efficiency (Rijkers et al., 2017). Read at this level, trade fraud is not a series of discrete offenses at the counter but an alliance of state, market, and criminal actors in which officials and intermediaries sell access to the border, a configuration that exceeds ordinary customs violations and erodes the fiscal and competitive order of the economy (Hrechyn & Burba, 2018). This is the reading that an economic-criminology lens recommends, and it carries a clear implication for enforcement: because the vulnerability at the node is relational, prosecuting one official or seizing one consignment leaves the arrangement intact. What must be disrupted is the collusive relationship itself, a point to which the article returns when it locates the strongest leverage away from downstream seizure.

Downstream of the node the chain runs through warehousing and online distribution, and these are the stages the police actually reach. Warehousing aggregates consignments inland, where baled goods are consolidated, repackaged, and held until demand absorbs them, so the warehouse functions less as storage than as the point at which the enterprise folds illicit stock into apparently ordinary inventory (Ramdania et al., 2025; Sinamo et al., 2022). Distribution then disperses the goods, increasingly through online marketplaces that widen the buyer base and fragment the trade into transactions too small and too numerous for conventional interdiction; the regulatory response, the prohibition on selling restricted goods through electronic systems under Minister of Trade Regulation No. 31 of 2023, signals how central the digital channel has become. Because warehousing and distribution are visible and physical, they attract the bulk of police activity, yet they sit far downstream of where value is set, which is precisely why enforcement concentrated here removes goods without reaching the economics that generate them.

Onto this chain the article overlays jurisdiction, and the overlay is the pivot of the argument, so the legal architecture deserves to be set out. The Customs Law (Law No. 17 of 2006, amending Law No. 10 of 1995) defines the customs area (*kawasan pabean*) and vests the Directorate General of Customs and Excise with authority inside it, where its officials inspect cargo, assess value, and may investigate through civil-servant investigators (*Penyidik Pegawai Negeri Sipil*, PPNS) (Sinamo et al., 2022; Tondy, 2019). The same law criminalizes smuggling, since Article 102 covers unlawful import and Article 102B raises the penalty to between five and twenty years of imprisonment when the smuggling disturbs the national economy (Ramdania et al., 2025; Rahmawati, 2022). The Trade Law (Law No. 7 of 2014) and its implementing regulations add the import-licensing and prohibition regime, including the ban on imported used clothing that drives much of the trade examined here. The prohibition currently rests on Minister of Trade Regulation No. 47 of 2025 on Goods Prohibited from Import, issued under the Trade Law as amended by Law No. 6 of 2023 and in force since 1 January 2026, which classifies used clothing under tariff heading HS 6309.00.00 as a prohibited import and supersedes the earlier instruments cited in prior studies, namely Minister of Trade Regulations No. 51/2015, No. 18/2021, and No. 40/2022; the parallel prohibition on selling such goods through electronic platforms rests on Minister of Trade Regulation No. 31 of 2023.

The police occupy the other side of this boundary. The Indonesian National Police holds general criminal jurisdiction under the Police Law (Law No. 2 of 2002), and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Law No. 8 of 1981) governs how it investigates and how it coordinates with the customs investigators once a matter enters the criminal track (Tondy, 2019). In practice the police act only after goods have left the customs area, and *Bareskrim* conducts its investigations beyond that line, so police work centers on warehouses, distribution, and online sales (Ramdania et al., 2025; Sinamo et al., 2022). The two agencies meet at a seam, where the customs investigators work the area of entry and the police work the territory beyond it.

This division produces a structural mismatch. The incentives that drive the enterprise form inside the customs area, where the police hold no operational authority, and the police acquire authority only after the goods have cleared. The seam between the two agencies is therefore not a matter of administrative tidiness but the place where the enterprise is most exposed and the police least able to act. Comparative work on customs and law-enforcement cooperation treats this seam as a recurring obstacle to coherent action against smuggling and a frequent point at which enforcement loses traction (Dorofeieva, 2024).

From the mismatch follows a displacement dilemma. Police enforcement concentrated downstream, on seizures at warehouses and in online marketplaces, removes goods without removing the incentive to import them, so it deters without disrupting. Two literatures support the inference. Studies of organized crime record that supply and demand move geographically under pressure, so enforcement at one point reorganizes an operation instead of ending it (van de Bunt & Siegel, 2003). A formal model of enforcement in interdependent supply chains reaches a parallel conclusion, since action against one market generates spillovers into others, with intended and unintended effects that turn on the point of intervention (Chen & Tsay, 2023). Because this article works from secondary sources, the dilemma stands as a proposition for empirical testing rather than as a finding, and the thesis that follows is designed to test it.

These propositions combine into a framework that positions the intervention points of the Indonesian National Police along the supply chain. The framework crosses the chain with the hierarchy of intervention strategies that Dean et al. (2010) arrange from civil to criminal, namely administrative, regulatory, revenue, asset-recovery, and prosecutorial remedies. Set against the jurisdictional boundary, the police occupy the downstream, prosecutorial end, far from the customs node where the incentives form. Their leverage therefore lies in the strategies that cross the boundary, in the revenue and asset-recovery tiers and in shared intelligence, and not in further downstream seizure. The claim that the prosecutorial tier yields the least strategic leverage is an interpretation of Dean et al. (2010) for a supply chain divided between two jurisdictions, and the article argues for it rather than assuming it. Figure 1 presents the framework.



Figure 1. A framework positioning the intervention points of the Indonesian National Police along the illegal-import supply chain, mapped onto the intervention hierarchy of Dean et al. (2010). INP denotes the Indonesian National Police (Polri); DJBC denotes the Directorate General of Customs and Excise.

The framework reorients police strategy within the existing mandate of the Indonesian National Police. *The first move* directs enforcement at the offender's economics through money-laundering investigation and asset recovery instead of the seizure of goods downstream. Profit is the organizing logic of the enterprise, so removing proceeds strikes the motive that seizure leaves intact. The literature that links organized and financial crime treats this as the more durable lever and points to instruments such as asset confiscation and unexplained wealth orders that reach the proceeds an enterprise depends on (Jasinski et al., 2023). A money-laundering investigation also carries the police across the jurisdictional boundary, because financial flows do not stop at the edge of the customs area, and it reaches the organizers who never handle the goods themselves. This lever bears directly on the customs node itself: the mis-invoicing, misclassification, and quantity manipulation that set value at entry are themselves recognized techniques of trade-based money laundering, meaning the disguising of illicit proceeds through falsified trade transactions, so the documentary manipulation that customs treats as a valuation problem is, in financial terms, a laundering channel that an investigation can follow upstream (FATF, 2020). Indonesian law already supplies the basis for this move. Law No. 8 of 2010 on the Prevention and Eradication of the Crime of Money Laundering lists customs offenses among its predicate crimes in Article 2(1), so the proceeds of illegal importation fall within its reach, and the Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (PPATK), the national financial intelligence unit, can trace and report the associated financial flows. Since Constitutional Court Decision No. 15/PUU-XIX/2021, investigators competent over the predicate offense may themselves investigate the money-laundering offense, which widens the room for police action across the customs boundary. A dedicated forfeiture statute would sharpen this lever further, but the Asset Forfeiture Bill (RUU Perampasan Aset), although prioritized in the 2025–2026 national legislation program, has not yet been enacted, so the analysis rests on the money-laundering regime currently in force rather than on anticipated legislation.

The second move integrates intelligence across agencies, with the customs authority as the central partner, by following the money and the documents under a whole-of-government approach (Dean et al., 2010; Kupatadze, 2025). The customs authority holds the manifest, declaration, and valuation data generated at entry, while the police hold the downstream picture of warehouses and distribution, and neither view is complete on its own. Joining the two converts isolated seizures into a map of the enterprise. Research on cross-border economic crime finds that few standing structures actually bring the relevant public and private actors together, which marks integration as a gap to close instead of a phrase to repeat (Button et al., 2025; Legrand & Leuprecht, 2021).

The Indonesian materials give this move concrete shape. Customs supervision already operates on an intelligence logic of following the goods, the money, the documents, and the persons, and analysts argue that its effectiveness depends on pooling data from every relevant agency into a single fusion-style picture rather than leaving each institution to act on its own fragment (Yudha et al., 2024). The June 2026 interception illustrates what such pooling can achieve, since it was produced not at the inspection line but through intelligence shared across the customs authority, military intelligence, the armed forces, the prosecution service, and the police supervisory function for investigators (Directorate General of Customs and Excise, 2026). The recurring obstacle is not the absence of a model but the weakness of coordination in practice, which Indonesian studies of other smuggling streams identify as a persistent enforcement gap (Prasetiyo, 2024; Achmad, 2026). For the police, the implication is specific: their downstream view of warehouses and distribution is one input the shared picture needs, and supplying it is itself a strategic contribution that does not require acting inside the customs area.

The third move targets the business model and the collusive relationships that sustain it. Supervised delivery offers one concrete technique that operates within police powers and reaches actors beyond the point of seizure, since it allows a consignment to proceed under surveillance so that organizers, financiers, and distributors come into view (Nastas & Cicală, 2024). Used against an import enterprise, the technique shifts the object of enforcement from the consignment to the organization behind it, exposing the brokers and financiers whose role the convergence of illicit flows would otherwise keep hidden, and it does so without the police having to enter the customs area at all. Across all three moves, the framework avoids recommendations aimed at rotating or vetting border officials, because those measures belong to the customs authority and would blur the question this article asks, which is what the police themselves can do from their position outside the customs area.

CONCLUSION

The Indonesian National Police positions itself strategically not by multiplying seizures downstream but by choosing intervention points that cross the customs boundary. The incentives that drive illegal importation form at the customs node, inside the jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Customs and Excise, while the police gain authority only downstream, so downstream repression shifts the modus operandi without reducing volume. The leverage of the police lies in the revenue and asset-recovery tiers and in shared intelligence across agencies. The article makes one conceptual contribution: it reframes illegal importation as an organized economic enterprise and adapts the intervention hierarchy of Dean et al. (2010) to a supply chain split between two jurisdictions in the Indonesian setting. Every claim stands as an analytical proposition rather than an empirical finding.

The posture this implies is not a call for more enforcement but for differently placed enforcement, and three moves give it content. Directing investigation at the offender's economics through money-laundering and asset-recovery procedures attacks the profit that seizure leaves untouched; integrating intelligence with the customs authority and the other agencies that hold pieces of the picture converts isolated seizures into a map of the enterprise; and using supervised delivery turns a single consignment into a route to the organizers behind it. None of the three requires the police to act inside the customs area, and each draws on authority the Indonesian National Police already holds, which is what makes the reorientation a feasible adjustment of practice rather than an aspiration that waits on new powers or new legislation.

The limitation is plain. Without primary data, the claims about displacement and about the weakness of the police at the collusion node remain propositions to be tested, and that is where this preliminary study connects to the thesis it precedes. Three lines of testing follow. Mirror-trade data can quantify mis-invoicing and misclassification along the lines Kupatadze (2025) sets out, with due caution about the reliability of mirror statistics (Nitsch, 2017). Court decisions and case files can trace the network structure that the warehouse figures only suggest. Interviews with investigators can assess how interagency coordination works in practice. A further limit concerns generalization, since the framework draws on theory developed largely in Western settings, so its application to Indonesia needs the field validation that the thesis will supply.

Beyond the Indonesian case, the article offers a transferable way of reading supply-chain crime: locate the economic incentive, set it against the jurisdictional map, and ask where the agency in question can actually intervene rather than assuming that more effort at the visible end will help. For the study of policing in Indonesia in particular, this shifts the question from whether the police are authorized to act, which existing scholarship has largely settled, to where their action does the most work, which it has not. The framework developed here is the conceptual half of a larger inquiry, and the empirical half that would test it belongs to the thesis this study introduces, to which the present argument is designed to lead.

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